


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
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CONTRACT VERSUS MILITARY PILOT TRAINING  
IN TODAY'S AIR FORCE

By COLONEL WILLIAM A. JOHANSEN



AIR UNIVERSITY  
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE  
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

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by

WILLIAM A. JOHANSEN  
Colonel, USAF

A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY  
IN  
FULFILLMENT OF THE RESEARCH  
REQUIREMENT

Research Advisor: Lt Col Barry Levitz

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

MAY 1987



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# AIR WAR COLLEGE RESEARCH REPORT ABSTRACT

TITLE: Contract Versus Military Pilot Training in  
Today's Air Force  
AUTHOR: William A. Johansen, Colonel, USAF

An historical narrative of the training of military pilots using civilian contract instructors and a make-up of the current student and instructor pilot force in the United States Air Force Undergraduate Pilot Training provides background. This is followed by a number of arguments favoring the continuation of using military instructors to teach military pilots. Problems evolving from the inability to hire enough civilian instructors with adequate experience and the military essentiality of teaching officer qualities in addition to flying skills are discussed in the conclusion. A few suggestions on specific areas to consider, should the political decision be made to contract pilot training, are also provided in the conclusion. (Semi)

## BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Colonel William A. Johansen (M.A., Webster University) has been directly involved in pilot training operations since 1973. After four years as an RF-4C Weapons System Operator in South East Asia and Okinawa, he attended pilot training at Vance. He then became a T-38 Instructor pilot and flight commander before three years of broadening, working in logistics and attending Air Command and Staff College. He then returned to UPT operations, filling every position through Squadron Commander, and served two tours at Air Training Command Headquarters, DCS Operations. There he was the T-37 Side Chief of ATC Standardization and Evaluation and later, Chief of the Pilot Training Division, Directorate of Training. Colonel Johansen is a graduate of the Air War College, class of 1988.

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## CHAPTER I

### Introduction

In the never ending efforts to reduce government spending, civilian contracting of military functions often appears to provide rapid payback. Taxpayer expectation, Reagan administration philosophy of decentralization and pro-business government, and aggressive business marketing, support the notion that privatization is inherently superior to government run services. (1:32) Air Force Regulations (70 series) and Air Force Pamphlets (400 series), state that civilian personnel will be used in positions which by law, do not require military, because of training, security, discipline, rotation or combat readiness, or which do not require a military background for successful performance of duty. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76 also establishes a national policy of relying on the private sector to provide goods and services, except when it is in the national interest for the government to provide its own.

With the cost of equipment skyrocketing, administrative and manpower cuts are coming under increased scrutiny to provide some of the offset for

the budget battle. Manpower costs consume over fifty per cent of the defense outlays despite recent cuts. As a result, congress will mandate more than a 100 percent increase in the number of major base services contracted out by 1990. (2:25) While it is easy to understand why the B-52 pilot or foot soldier cannot be contracted to the lowest bidder, training of the military pilot is not quite so obvious.

The U.S. Air Force has strongly argued against contracting many of its responsibilities on the grounds of military essentiality. Significant inroads in the contracting of related areas has weakened the military essentiality position. Successes, such as contracting of portions of Army flight training, Air Force Combat Crew Training of the C-130 airlift pilot, Navy contracting of its flight training simulator instruction, Navy contract pilot use in Naval Flight Officer training and its recent contract with British Aerospace/McDonnell Douglas to contract the T-45 Goshawk, academic and simulator training, all make the military essentiality argument softer.

To complicate the debate between the pro-contract politician and the military essentiality proponent is the "apples and oranges" nature of the issue. The politician is looking at the bottomline dollar and the



military position is that cost alone, is not the primary consideration. This paper will address those issues and attempt to clarify some of the facts and assumptions. The conclusion will summarize the authors' position on the thesis and make some recommendations should the decision be made for privatization.

## CHAPTER II

### Background

#### Contracting Trends

For thirty five years there has been a government trend to rely on contracting to the private sector whenever possible. Although congressional recommendations date back to the 1930's, the first executive branch reference was made in President Eisenhower's budget message of January 21, 1956, in which he said:

This budget marks the beginning of a movement to shift... to private enterprise (those) Federal activities which can be more appropriately and more efficiently carried on in that way. (3:3)

Since then, the emphasis of the intent has gone through several iterations. In general, there has been an increase in the tendency to broaden the scope of those areas considered appropriate for privatization. This trend has been advocated by administrations of both parties, but interest has heightened in the past few years since the Reagan administration has repeatedly emphasized the importance of relying on the privatization. (3:4)

The current policy is laid out in OMB Circular A-76, which generally requires cost comparison as the

basis for determining whether government functions should be contracted. The Circular does not, however, reference any possibility that the decision might be based on other factors such as quality of the product, performance, efficiency, force structure requirements, readiness or liability. This shortcoming has been the target of several congressmen, but no revision has sufficiently addressed the problem. Further, the Circular provides some inequities in the manner of making comparisons. For example, when computing the cost of Government employee retirement benefits, 20.4 per cent of salary is the required factor, but there is no such requirement when computing the cost of the contractors. (3:7) This distorts the cost comparison figures.

The General Accounting Office (GAO) has also questioned the validity of a number of specific conversions to contract operations on the basis of the contractors' planning to use fewer employees and to pay them less. (3:20) Either would have a negative effect on retention, and in fact may only show a short term savings to favor conversion. Long term efficiency may require increases in both manpower and pay. Another study of twelve specific conversions in the Army and Air Force found questionable cost

comparisons in each. The GAO stated the contractors tended to overstate in-house costs or understate contract costs, favoring contracting out. (3:10)

The question of comparison by cost will remain a controversial one. Too many variables exist in how computations are made and whether a short term cost saving is really economic in the long run. It is obviously difficult to compute objectively and its accuracy is subject to question. DoD does not have the infrastructure or the resources to accurately perform all the reviews necessary, further making the process controversial. (3:9)

#### Contracting of Flying Training

Contract military flying schools were begun in 1939 for the Army Air Corps. As World War II mobilization began, the number of schools increased until a total of 99 flying schools operated at one time or another during the War. Approximately 250,000 students graduated from contract primary schools. (4:1)

The lack of military pilots made contracting the only method of training that could satisfactorily get the maximum training capability in the minimum amount of time. After World War II, disarmament was so extensive that when the Korean War began, civilian

contracting again was required to train the large number of pilots in the minimum time.(4:1)

During these two periods of contract training, brought on by war, only the "primary" phase was contracted. This phase was taught in conventional, lower performance aircraft than the "basic" phase, which included more military specific skills such as formation and advanced handling. Although a test attempt to contract the basic phase occurred in 1941, it was never adopted. (4:20)

Early contracts included not only the instructor pilots, but also the base support function. By 1960, it was decided that consolidating pilot training bases would more than offset the savings of contracting and it was ended at that time. (4:20) When contracting was reconsidered briefly in 1967, Air Training Command's (ATC) position was summarized in a letter from Mr Joseph V. Charyk, Acting Secretary of the Air Force, to Representative Joe M. Kilgore:

The sum total of ATC's attitude toward contract pilot training is that it has been a get-well-quick scheme during periods of rapid expansion. In these instances (WWII and Korea), it has effectively done the job. Historically, the Air Force has opposed contract training for decreased pressure times. Also, historically, DoD has pushed contracting on the basis of cost. Contracting is cheaper by about 20 per cent. AF's main argument, and for some reason we

have been unable to adequately communicate this conclusively to DoD, is that while it is cheaper by the flying hour, an unknown measure of quality is lost in other areas. The primary, but immeasurable losses, are flying and maintenance experience for AF personnel. (4:21)

Again in 1979, contracting became a major issue when the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) directed a study under Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76 to assess contract operations of the primary phase. Contracting the T-37 training would release those instructor pilots to fill other Air Force duties. This would supposedly help relieve the pilot shortage of the time and save money by avoiding an increase in pilot training accessions to fulfill the shortage. (4:20)

ATC again opposed the concept. It stated the case that instructors provide an essential cross flow of experience between ATC and the operational commands. The experience gained while flying as an instructor was considerable. That contributed to the overall flying expertise of the Air Force in the cheapest possible jet aircraft. It also feared that contract instruction would exacerbate rather than alleviate the pilot shortage by establishing a competing job market for Air Force trained pilots. (4:21)

### Student-IP Force

Some background on the student and military instructor pilot (IP) force in UPT is necessary to understand some of the problems associated with contracting the training.

The fiscal year '86 programmed production for UPT was approximately 1600 pilots. The nearly 2100 entries to meet production came from a variety of sources and backgrounds: Officer Training School, Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps, U.S. Air Force Academy and a few officers who were serving in other specialties. (5:1) The vast majority were new second lieutenants.

The IP force is made up of two major groups from an experience point of view. The majority (about 65 per cent) are First Assignment Instructor Pilots (FAIP) who entered the IP force immediately after graduating from UPT. They are mostly young (22-24 year old) lieutenants who will serve a three year IP tour before going to a major weapon system. The second group is made up of those who went to a major weapon system, such as a B-52, F-15 or C-141, from UPT and then returned to serve a four year tour as an IP. They bring with them the experience of flying in

different aircraft and working in the different environments of the other major commands.

The 52 week curriculum of UPT includes academic training, officer development, physical education and conditioning, simulator training and flights in the T-37 and T-38 aircraft. Because the vast majority of the students are newly commissioned, the Air Force trainers believe it must develop not only quality flying skills but also positive attitudes toward the military career. Maximum exposure to the military and its people is considered an integral part of the training.



## CHAPTER III

### Contract Versus Military

#### Skill Requirements

Obtaining the proper kind and number of instructors to contract UPT would be a primary obstacle. Although there is probably a sufficient number of FAA Certified Flight Instructors (CFI) to man the number of positions required, their qualification would be significantly different than required by the Air Force. Some would have a military flying background and would only require some refresher training, but the majority would need significant training in areas to which they had never been exposed. It was much easier during the WW II and Korean wars to find instructors with adequate skills for primary flying as the difference in performance between the military and civilian aircraft was not that great. Now, nearly all the military aircraft are either large, multiengine or high performance jets while the majority of civilian aircraft are the single engine propeller type.

The civilian instructor force the Army uses in its helicopter training could be cited as an exception to the Air Force argument; but taking a closer look at

its situation may prove to be a poor comparison. There are approximately 300 contract IPs at Fort Rucker, representing about 50 per cent of the IP force. Fifty to sixty per cent of these IPs were warrant officers while serving on active duty. (6:31) The retired or separated Army warrant officer who is a rated helicopter pilot would have more incentive to become an IP than a retired or separated Air Force officer. The AF officer would more likely fly with a commercial airline or make use of his college degree to take advantage of the higher wage earning capability. The demand for helicopter pilots in the civilian sector is significantly smaller than for fixed wing skills.

The other drawback to contract instruction, from the point of view of the Air Force and Navy, is that the military pilot has very different skill requirements from the civilian sector. This includes the cockpit environment--the stick, the mask, the parachute, the ejection seat--as well as the maneuvers flown. Overhead traffic patterns, aerobatics, spins, formation flying, low level navigation-- all are taught because of their direct application in operation and they build confidence in the student who must be trained to operate with strict discipline

while operating the aircraft to the limit of its performance.

A large part of military flying training is the relating of maneuvers taught to the real world of military flying. It is the recent fighter pilot explaining the application of aerobatics or tactical formation to air-to-air combat, or the former B-52 pilot relating low level navigation to requirements on a strategic bombing mission. It is also the young FAIP relating the same information second hand plus personal accounts of recently coping with the challenges of the UPT program.

Because the vast majority of the UPT students are second lieutenants, the officer development aspects of UPT are extremely important. To teach the strict discipline required to lead a formation in combat, night air-to-air refueling in the weather or the three dimensional, high g-force requirement of air-to-air combat, requires the credibility of those who have experienced it. A civilian CFI would lack that credibility. Coincidentally, there are several UPT students each year who do not graduate from UPT even though they come with a CFI rating. The requirements, pace and skills are significantly different.

### Training

Training the civilian contractor so that he could productively accomplish the job now being performed by the military IP would require an extensive program. Those who have no military flying training would obviously need much more. It costs about \$105,000 to train a military pilot to be a T-37 IP and about \$161,000 for the T-38.(5:1) For pilots with no aerobatic or formation experience, you could safely anticipate doubling the cost of Pilot Instructor School, which would also require an increase in manning to compensate for the increased student load.

Other training costs would also be increased because of the lack of familiarity with some of the required additional duties. Runway supervisory duties, supervisor of flying duties, student faculty board member duties, grade book documentation and safety investigation of aircraft incidents are all second nature to the military IP because of constant exposure. The contract IP would be trainable in any of these areas, but an additional training cost would have to be considered in the writing of a contract.

The area of officer development is another serious deficiency when considering training the

contractors. Contract IPs could be taught the formal instruction easily enough but their application in day-to-day contact with the student would be limited. As the Honorable Harold Brown so aptly put it when he was Secretary of the Air Force, "The instructor influence extends far beyond the subject matter he is formally assigned to teach." (6:VII) Other related decisions would also be a problem. For example, near the end of T-38 training, the IPs and supervisors make a determination on all students to decide if they will be qualified to fly Fighter-Attack-Reconnaissance (FAR) type or Tanker-Transport-Bomber (TTB) type aircraft when they graduate from UPT. This decision is subjective to a large degree, based on the experience of the instructors who have flown with the student. An inaccurate decision can be very costly. If FAR qualified pilots do not measure up to their expectations, and are eliminated from follow-on training in an F-15, F-16 or F-111, millions would be wasted on training. They would then meet a Flying Evaluation Board (FEB) and either be sent to a TTB type aircraft or they would lose their pilot rating. Even worse, they could barely make it through fighter training and possibly lose an aircraft or their own life.

### Compensation Methods

The Air Force screens potential pilot candidates from Officer Training School and Reserve Officer Training Corps, to select those best qualified for UPT. As the Air Force experienced in its flight screening programs, the way a contract is written for compensation can have an effect on the outcome of pilot production. A "fixed price" contract, which is favored by OMB, will always create problems in flexibility which were not anticipated as a cost; (i.e. weather, attrition rates, fluctuating student loads, syllabus changes). If the price is based on the number of students entering pilot training, it can create pressure by the contractor to eliminate students; as monies for those hours the student does not fly, would already be paid and would be clear profit. Conversely, if paid by the number that graduate, contractors have pressure to get even the weaker ones through. If students are eliminated, the contractor loses what has been spent on the student to that point. A third option would be to pay by the flying hour. This would encourage longer sortie lengths, extra review rides and the result would be not eliminating the weaker students until the last possible point in training.

Under a firm-fixed-price not related to flying hours, the contractor payment would not be linked to syllabus flight sortie production or quality of instruction. A statement of work would have to contain a penalty for failure to provide a service to help compensate for any deficiencies in quality, but that is a very difficult thing to arbitrate and has the potential of leading to labor disputes. A "cost-plus" may be the best method of compensation. This method pays the contractor accountable costs, plus a predetermined profit margin. The problem is, the monitoring of the costs and pluses can lead to interpretation differences which may require arbitration. This method is also the least favored by OMB because accountability is more subjective.

Once a contract is in being, it is a limiting factor on flexibility from the point of view of the Air Force. For example, if a change to the syllabus of instruction were felt to be necessary because of some feedback from the using commands, the process would be greatly slowed while waiting for adjustments to or renegotiation of the contract agreements among the Air Force, the contractor, and if organized, the union. At any rate, any change would mean expenditure of more money.

Two other areas of concern would be the problem of liability and high turn-over of IPs. In a Navy study conducted in the summer of 1986, four contract instructors were used for its TA-4, primary flight training. Even though the government (not the individual contractor) was held liable for any litigation that might arise from a mishap, the issue became a factor several times when anything out of the ordinary was considered. (7:15) Things like orientation rides for visiting dignitaries, fly-by demonstrations, continuation training for the contract instructors, and cross country flights with two contractors, always raised a question as to whether the situation was covered under the liability agreement between the contractor and the government. If there were an accident which was the fault of the contract pilot, was the government or the contractor liable? A listing of problem areas from the Navy study included the following quote:

The contract pilots did not seem to completely understand their company's position, vis-a-vis personal liability. (7:16)

The study also recommended having a contract penalty for high turn-over rate of the instructor force. Because of the relatively low contractor pay



and the commercial airline market, instructors would sign on until they got a better offer. The cost of training an instructor, not only in terms of dollars but in time, resources and impact on student sorties, could be substantial. (7:3)

#### Possible Labor Problems

At the heart of the contract versus military training is the possibility of labor disputes and strikes affecting the production of military pilots. Some of the more common origins of these disputes are as follows: (1) disagreement over contract requirements, (2) competitive pressure forcing contractors to interpret requirements at the minimum acceptable level (3) government program personnel interpreting performance at the maximum benefit to the agency (4) contractor normally dividing responsibility for bid/proposal and implementation (5) government bid analysis and award being done by personnel different from those establishing the requirements and being administered by yet a third party. (8:1)

The one option open to the government when contract labor problems could impact mission accomplishment is the use of contractors who have "no work stoppage" clauses in their union agreements. Some of the civilian airlines with government airlift

contracts have such clauses for DoD flights. History has shown, however, that these clauses are not always honored and the airlift is forced to resort to legal action. A contractor who would agree to a "no work stoppage" clause may be difficult to find. The military would have to pick up the slack if a work stoppage occurred.

The Army experienced this problem in 1970 when its contract IPs walked out. During a contractor change, the new contractor experienced a pilot strike immediately after taking over. After two weeks without a settlement, the Army stepped in and took control. Luckily, the Army had a cadre of qualified instructors to fill the void without major impact on combat capability. It was also lucky in that only a single base and only one category of training was affected. (6:34) Should the Air Force be struck by a UPT contractor, it could be at six bases and would affect all categories of training. There would never be enough military IPs to cover a full scale contract work stoppage and delays in pilots going to weapons systems would have a ripple effect from which it would take years to recover.

The previously mentioned Navy contract test also experienced a strike. Luckily, only a two week delay

occurred. The delay provided acute awareness that the expense and confusion could seriously jeopardize pilot training requirements in a large scale contractor operation.(7:16)

Management stability could be another area of concern. Under OMB Circular A-76, UPT under a contract operation would require a formal cost comparison review every five years. If the cost of operation were found to be less expensive with a different manager, a contractor change would result. Such a complete change would create extreme turmoil in the training environment. A new learning period would begin for the contractor and new working relations with the military member would have to be developed. The trust and communications that had grown over the past few years would be gone.

A similar problem develops if the contractor is found to be unsatisfactory. In a five year period at Charleston Air Force Base, the commander had to take over the food service from a food contractor three times. Yet, because of the requirements in Circular A-76, he had to put it right back on contract even though he had to take it over for periods of up to ninety days. (3:14)

As touched upon earlier, training quality is the primary concern with a contract operation. Limited military contact would not enhance the professional military attitude desired by the Air Force. Duty, honor and country are not found in an environment where money is the motivator and eight-to-five work hours prevail. Loss of quality could also be expected because student demands on instructors for extra time after traditional work hours would no longer be the routine.

Loss of standardization would be another concern to work. Currently, all the IPs have the common attributes of having completed UPT themselves and a sense of military responsibility toward country and fellow pilots. Civilian IPs would come from a wide variety of backgrounds, training and philosophies.

The military flying experience that would be lost when replaced by civilian contract populations is often overlooked. Each year Air Training Command flies thousands of training sorties. Although a small percentage of these were solo students, the vast majority were with an instructor pilot. These sorties flown by the instructors are added to the Air Force pilot experience level and, if contracted, the USAF would lose that instructor expertise and invaluable

experience. The IP force is gaining experience which they will take to their major weapon system when they leave. Experience gained in the T-37 and T-38 aircraft is among the cheapest and most versatile available. To give that experience up would not meet logic, yet it is easily overlooked and misunderstood when accountants are scrutinizing budgets.

#### Force Management

The Air Force rated force is sensitive to external and internal personnel forces. Ever changing requirements and composition demand constant management attention. The management model is, not surprisingly, called the Rated Management Model. It is composed of inputs (UPT, reassignments), requirements (advanced training, operational crew force, staff), and losses (promotions, separation/retirement, AFIT, PME, rated supplement). This multi-directional flow of personnel requires careful management by the Military Personnel Center to maintain stability and experience at the desired levels. (6141-43)

If all but a few supervisory military IPs were replaced with civilian contractors, a resulting 24 per cent increase in the number of UPT graduates

distributed to the major weapon systems would result. (6:43) This high number would cause serious problems related to the number of "mission ready" crews. It would require a much longer time for copilots to gain the experience necessary to upgrade to aircraft commander because of the number competing for experience. The additional training requirements resulting from the larger number of UPT graduate inputs into all major weapon systems would exceed their capability to train them. Although this would help relieve the pilot shortage temporarily, it would be a one time surge which would not help the long range problem of maintaining an experienced pool of pilots for the combat aircraft.

The cost of getting experience for the pilots would increase at least ten fold when comparing the cost of flying in a T-37 or T-38 to that of an F-15 or C-5 aircraft. The IP force is an efficient and effective means of providing experience to a large pool of pilots who will then take that experience to the major weapon system when they leave the training environment.

The number of women pilots in the Air Force is based on statutory restriction which prohibits women from flying aircraft engaged in combat. Since a large

portion of the female pilot positions are as ATC IPs, privatization of any portion of UPT would reduce the available positions, reducing the number of women pilots who could be used.

### Retention

Retention is of primary concern to the services. By the time a pilot has reached a fully mission ready status, millions of dollars may have been invested in their training. Creating a civilian IP force would provide a new job market for military pilots and cause future retention problems which are difficult to measure.

Since much of a young officer's career intent is formed during their first years of commissioned service, their exposure to civilian IPs could be covertly detrimental to the formation of a positive attitude toward a career. Factors such as better working hours, few ground additional jobs, compensation for overtime and a stable lifestyle may all serve to erode the student pilot's interest in the Air Force way of life. The hiring of separated service members would make a statement to the young officer even if the member did not display a negative attitude toward the military.

With each military IP position lost, there would be one less role model available, resulting in less reinforcement by older military pilots on the positive aspects of being an Air Force pilot. The privatization also presents an alternate source of ready employment while waiting for an airline job. The discussions would naturally turn, at times, to the advantages of the airline pilot lifestyle, which could influence junior officers from retention.



## CHAPTER IV

### Simulator-only Contract

To this point, discussion has been based on the assumption that UPT would be contracted in total. A frequently mentioned alternative would be to contract simulator instruction only. The aircraft instruction would remain with military IPs. There is an historical foundation for this argument as, until the late 1970's, nonrated enlisted Air Force members instructed most of the Link trainer lessons in UPT. IPs took the responsibility when actual simulators, with much more sophisticated capabilities to emulate the actual aircraft performance, replaced the Link trainers.

There would be some positive aspects to contracting the simulators. Military IPs would rather fly aircraft than the simulator although they readily recognize the importance of good simulator procedure and instrument training. It is conceivable that a dedicated civilian instructor force could make better use of the simulator's capabilities. The military IPs often do not have the time, due to the demanding schedule, to learn some of the more subtle capabilities because they are always rushed to get on

with other "more important" tasks- that of flying the actual aircraft and student ground instruction or critique.

On the negative side, however, the same arguments appear that exist against contracting the aircraft instruction. Operational flexibility impact would be weekend simulator training that would cost more due to overtime payments. Adding or cancelling from the number of simulators scheduled for the day would be expensive. Contractor performance and strike threat could impact operational capability. The loss of instructor/student continuity associated with a separate simulator/aircraft force would probably reduce training effectiveness. For example, the continuity of mistakes in the simulator could not be personally carried-over to deficiencies in the aircraft. The students would not regard the instruction of a simulator-only instructor with the same respect as that of a "real IP".

One of the biggest arguments against contracting the simulators is that it would result in a ten per cent manpower cut in the IP force. (9:1) This would effect all the factors previously mentioned in reference to rated force management. It would also reduce the flying wings' important capability to surge

in aircraft sorties during good weather periods because they would be IP limited. The ten percent who were previously available would now be civilian simulator instructors who can not instruct in the aircraft. This lack of surge capability would require either more week-end flying to remain on schedule, or a slightly reduced student load at each base.

## CHAPTER V

### Conclusions

Considering the purpose of UPT, the role played by the military IP force and the impact of the alternative, it is difficult to come to any conclusion other than the essentially of the military instructor pilot. Serious management problems with the rated force would arise with the civilian alternative. It would be nearly impossible to find enough qualified civilian pilots, and even with extensive training, they could not match the ability of the military IP to relate their firsthand experience at the degree that is needed in today's sophisticated environment. With the airlines hiring at their current rate, the UPT squadrons would become the gateway of experience to boost qualification for hiring. Thousands of flying hours would be diverted to civilian pilots rather than being used to experience the military pilot force. Combat readiness would be effected by the large number of new UPT graduates going to major weapon systems without the seasoning capability of 3 years IP experience.

The whole new world of contract problems would significantly change the direct control commanders now

have over their operations. Work stoppages, high turnover rates and low experience levels, and complete change in management from contractor change would all become the new problems facing the UPT wings.

Vice Admiral M. W. Cagle (USN Ret.) did an excellent job in summarizing the Navy position:

Since flight training is the most expensive of all types of training, it is only economic sense to keep the pilots we train and amortize their high training costs. This requires that the Navy train pilots for a career by giving them naval officer training as well as flight training. By so doing, the student officer pilot is able to compete fairly against their brother submarine and surface officers at the time of promotion. If our Navy pilots were trained by another service or even by contract we would produce a "truck driver" type pilot who would consider himself a "second class" citizen and noncompetitive against his brother officers for a career. The results would be even higher turnover of pilots leaving the service, less professionalism and greater than ever training costs. (6:30)

The Air Force agrees. Only Air Force pilots can significantly contribute to the UPT system which is designed to develop professional military officers as much as to provide skilled pilots. Only the military pilot can provide the necessary link between the officer-student and the curriculum while effectively relating operational applications to the training environment. Only the military IP can instill the

qualities of a professional combat pilot who will cut through the fog and fiction of war to fulfill the vital air power role.

Future programs may change many of the assumptions drawn here. If UPT goes to a true dual track or different training program to enable a student to become a TTB pilot versus a fighter or trainer, or if different aircraft, such as a single engine turboprop, are used prior to high performance training, then the contracting question may have to be revisited. But, under the current training programs the military IP is the only logical alternative.

If things change significantly enough to force contracting of some portion of UPT, the simulator instruction should be the first to be used as a trial basis. The academic instruction would be a second target but little would be gained as the few academic instructors throughout the command also fly student instructional sorties. It would give only the savings of allowing them to fly more student sorties which could eliminate few line IP positions.

While the partial contracting may appear to be cheaper on the surface, there were mentioned several hidden costs which have to be weighed. It is difficult to quantify in places, but the bottom line must

consider more than hard dollars. It appears that a cost-plus contract would work the best and production criteria should be met prior to payment. Work hours would need to be more closely aligned with the military and a penalty for excessive IP turnover should be included.

Let's hope the USAF is never forced into the situation where there is no choice but to contract training. With the complex weapon systems of today the USAF can not afford to take short cuts in developing the professional military pilot. The short term dollars saved could not buy the combat capability lost in experience and officer development. A previous Air Force Vice Chief of Staff, General Robert C. Mathis, summerized in a memorandum on the subject:

Unless we change current thinking among highest officials, we are slowly going to transition to an efficient peacetime force which cannot respond to wartime commitments... (3:13)

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